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I. INTRODUCTION 
The lEN Request for Proposals (RFP) promised a fair competitive bidding process for the 
lEN Project that would be conducted in accordance with the law. Syringa entered into an 
agreement withE-Rate educational services provider ENA to cooperate in that process by the 
submission of a responsive proposal. As a part of that agreement, Syringa provided firm prices 
for its connectivity services to ENA in exchange for ENA's agreement to usc Syringa 
exclusively if it received a contract for the Project. 
ENA built on the firm prices provided by Syringa to prepare and submit the highest 
ranked, lowest cost lEN proposal and received a statewide blanket purchase order (SBPO) from 
the Department of Administration (DOA) for the Project. Second place Qwest, which knew "all 
along that we would be providing connectivity", received an identical SBPO. 
Pressured by the State Respondents and Qwest following the issuance of the SBPOs, 
ENA breached its agreement with Syringa by agreeing to an illegal ''split" of the lEN Project 
resulting from amended SBPOs that allocated specialized E-Rate services to ENA but gave IEN 
connectivity exclusively to Qwest. 
Syringa received nothing as a result of its agreement with ENA. Qwest received all the 
IE!\ connectivity that ENA had agreed to obtain from Syringa and the State Respondents 
manipulated the competitive bidding process with apparent impunity. 
Syringa sued DOA to test the legality of the amended SBPOs, sued ENA for breach of 
contract and sued Qwcst and the State Respondents for interfering with the competitive bidding 
process and Syringa's contract with ENA. 
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The district court dismissed all of Syringa's claims at summary judgment The case is 
now before this Court for de novo review. 
The purposes of this Reply Brief are: 
1. To demonstrate that the issuance of the amended SBPOs that split the IEN Project 
into separate contracts for dissimilar services violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A 
that Syringa has standing to vindicate: 
2. To show why the Teaming Agreement between Syringa and ENA was an 
enforceable contract that was breached by ENA; 
3. To identify principles of law and disputes of material fact that preclude the 
dismissal of Syringa's interference claims; 
4. To reply to the Respondents' arguments concerning attorneys fees. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Split Of The lEN Project Was A Fundamental Violation Of Idaho Law That 
Syringa Has Standing To Vindicate. 
Syringa has consistently claimed that the amended SBPOs are unlawful because they 
violate Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. (Complaint, Count Two, ,1~ 69-76, R. pp. 29-30 and Count 
Three,~~ 77-94, R. pp. 30-33; Motion for Order to Show Cause and supporting materials, 
R. 00563 - 00688; Syringa's Opening Brief, pp. 32-36 and 48-51.) 
ENA accepts the amended SBPOs at face value, claims they were unilaterally imposed, 
and asserts that "the State reserved the right to split the award". (ENA's Amended Brief, pp. 3, 
16 and 22.) Qwest accepted the benefits of the amended SBPOs which it also claims were 
unilaterally imposed by DOA. The State Respondents, on the other hand, provide no substantive 
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defense of the amended SBPOs but attack Syringa's standing to assert that the amended SBPOs 
violate Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 25.) 
The district court was diverted from reviewing the legality of the amended SBPOs by its 
erroneous conclusion that Syringa was barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
The issue is now squarely before this Court. 
1. The Amended SBPOs Split the lEN Project. 
It is undisputed that the amended SBPOs split the lEN Project into two contracts for 
dissimilar services. The State Respondents admit this fact in their Counterstatement of Facts: 
On February 26, 2009, IDA issued Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and 
Amendment 1 to SBPO 1309. Id. at 588-593. Each Amendment 
stated: "It is the intent ofthe State ofldaho to amend SBPO 1308 
[SBPO 1309] to clarify the rules and responsibilities of the parties to 
the agreement." !d. at 588 and 592. Each amendment also stated: 
"The State considers Qwest and ENA equal partners in the lEN 
Project as demonstrated in the Intent to Award Letter dated January 
20,2009 and the subsequent SBPO 1308 [SBPO 1309] dated January 
28, 2009." Id. at 589 and 593. The Amendments clarify the scope of 
work for both Qwest and ENA, such that Qwest would be the general 
contractor in coordination with ENA, for all lEN technical network 
services, and ENA will be the Service Provider listed on the State's 
federal E-Rate Form 4 71 and will coordinate delivery of all lEN 
network services and support. Id. 588 and 592. (State Respondents' 
Brief, pp. 6-7.) 
ENA also admits that the amended SBPOs split the lEN Project, stating: 
The State did not award the lEN alliance the lEN contract; instead, it 
unilaterallv decided to solit the award between ENA (forE-rate) and 
-..F -1. ' / 
Qwest (for connectivity). (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 3; See also, pp. 
7, 8, 9, 20, 24-25 and 27) 
The State Respondents and ENA admit the lEN Project was split into dissimilar contracts, and 
the State Respondents also admit that Syringa was harmed as a result, stating: 
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The effect of Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and to SBPO 1309 was to 
assign to Qwest the "entire scope of work assigned to Syringa in the 
Teaming Agreement and the lEN Alliance Proposal." !d. at 1144. 
(State Respondents' Brief, p.7.) 
Qwest makes no effort to defend the legality of the amended SBPOs and offers no 
opposition to the conclusion that the amended SBPOs split the lEN Project into two separate 
contracts for dissimilar services. 
2. The Amended SBPOs Violate Idaho Law and Damaged Syringa. 
The Idaho competitive bidding process is described in detail in Idaho Code§§ 67-5715 
through 67-5740. These statutes govern bid specifications, the solicitation ofbids, protest of 
specifications, the selection of the lowest responsible bidder, multiple awards and the initial 
issuance of state contracts. These statutes also provide, as demonstrated in Syringa's Opening 
Brief, that it is unlawful for the State to award multiple contracts for dissimilar property to 
multiple bidders following competitive bidding. (Idaho Code§ 67-5718A, Syringa's Opening 
Brief, pp. 49-51.) 
Existing law becomes part of the contract that results from an RFP and an accepted bid. 
See, e.g., Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State of Idaho, Department of Administration, 137 
Idaho 663,667, 52 P.3d 307,311 (2002). Idaho Code§ 67-5718A was part of the law in 
existence in Idaho at the time of the lEN RFP, the Letter oflntent and the original SBPOs to 
ENA and to Qwest. Idaho Code§ 67-5718A authorizes awards and contracts to multiple bidders 
for the "same or similar property" in specific circumstances and subject to express conditions. It 
does not, however, authorize multiple awards for dissimilar property or "split" awards. 
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3. Syringa Has Standing to Challenge the Amended SBPOs. 
Neither Qwest nor ENA dispute Syringa's standing to challenge the amended SBPOs. 
The State Respondents discuss federal and state procurement cases supportive of the principle 
that disappointed bidders do not have standing to challenge an award absent authorizing 
legislation, but ultimately acknowledge that statutory law in the relevant jurisdiction usually 
controls. (State Respondents' Brief, pp. 1 0-15.) The applicable statute in this case is Idaho 
Code§ 10-1202. 
Subject to the constitutional "case or controversy" requirements of standing, Idaho Code 
§ 1 0-1202 provides access to the courts for persons whose rights are affected by contract, statute, 
franchise and/or similar relations. It states: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, 
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, 
ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations thereunder. 
Syringa is such a "person" and this case satisfies the "case or controversy" requirement 
addressed in Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); see also 
Scott v. Buhl Joint School District, 123 Idaho 779, 852 P.2d 1376 (1993). Syringa, as a 
subcontractor to ENA, incurred an admitted injury in fact that is directly related to the unlawful 
split of the lEN Project. The district court properly ruled that Syringa has constitutional standing 
to bring this action. (Memorandum Decision and Order, R. 1139-1159 and 1149-1153.) 
The State Respondents offer three faulty administrative law based theories against 
Syringa's standing to challenge the unlawful amended lEN SBPOs. 
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1. Syringa cannot challenge the amended SBPOs because it failed to protest the lEN 
RFP multiple award specifications (State Respondents' Brief, pp. 13-22); 
2. Syringa cannot challenge the amended SBPOs because it failed to protest the 
January 20, 2009 Notice oflntent (State Respondents· Brief, pp. 22-25); 
3. Syringa's contention that Idaho Code§ 67-5733(1 )(c) provides no post-contract 
administrative remedy is an irrelevant red herring (State Respondents' Brief, 
p. 25). 
Each of these theories is based on the false premise that Syringa failed to exhaust an available 
administrative remedy. 
(a) Syringa's Standing is Not Defeated by Failure to Challenge the lEN 
Bid Specifications. 
Syringa does not challenge the lEN bid specifications that lawfully provided the 
lEN Project could be the subject of a multiple award. Nonetheless, the State Respondents 
argue, based upon a misconstruction of Counts 2 and 3 of Syringa's Complaint, that 
Syringa lacks standing because it failed to protest the specifications of the lEN RFP. 
(State Respondents Brief, pp. 21-22, 25.) The State Respondents are wrong. 
Count Two of Syringa's Complaint alleges, in relevant part, that the "amended lEN 
purchase orders" (amended SBPOs) violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A, and that Gwartney and/or 
Zickau conspired with Qwest, in violation ofldaho Code § 67-5726, to exclude Syringa from 
participating in the lEN. Count Three of Syringa's Complaint alleges that the amended SBPOs 
violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A and seeks a declaratory judgment declaring the amended 
SBPOs void. Neither Count Two nor Count Three mentions or challenges the lEN 
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specifications. (R. 28-33, Complaint, Counts Two and Three,~~ 62-94.) Syringa contends the 
specifications to RFP 02160 support the making of a lawful I. C. § 67-5718A multiple award. 
Syringa's Complaint concerns the unlawful split that resulted from the amended SBPOs. 
The State Respondents' contention that Syringa has no standing to challenge the amended 
SBPOs because its Complaint challenges the legality of the multiple award under the lEN RFP 
specifications is not true, is not supported by the Complaint or the Record and has no merit. 
(b) Syringa' Standing Is Not Defeated by Failure to Challenge the 
Multiple Award of January 20,2009. 
The multiple award to ENA and Qwest was announced by the DOA on January 20,2009. 
Neither Syringa nor ENA protested the multiple award or claimed that ENA was the "lowest 
responsible bidder" under Idaho Code§ 67-5733(1)(c). Neither Syringa nor ENA had reason to 
protest because the January 20, 2009 Letter oflntent (R. 581) gives no indication that the lEN 
Project would be unlawfully split into two contracts for dissimilar property in violation ofldaho 
Code§ 67-5718A. Notably, Mr. Gwartney admitted that he knew that the project would be split, 
admitted that the Letter of Intent said nothing about the project being split, and did nothing to 
advise the bidders the award would be split before the appeal time had run: 
Q. Okay. Would you agree that the lEN project and the contracts 
that were ultimately let, in simple terms, involve E-Rate and 
connectivity as two separate elements? 
A. I would agree that those are two critical elements, yes. 
Q. Okay. And one of those elements was, according to this split, 
to be provided by ENA? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was theE-Rate component; correct? 
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A Among other things, but that was their special skill, yeah. 
Q. Okay. And it was the connectivity component -- that is, 
actually making the connections and providing the broadband that 
was to be exclusively Qwest under this bid split? 
A Qwest and/or whoever they authorized to work with, whatever 
other words there are. 
Q. Okay. And that was the intent of the letter of intent dated 
January 20, 2009? 
A You're back to Exhibit 27? 
Q. Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q. Where does it say that the award in the contracts would be 
split in that fashion on Exhibit 27? 
A It doesn't say that. 
Q. Do you know how the split that you've just described for me, 
which generally involves E-Rate going to ENA and Internet 
connectivity going to Qwest, was communicated to ENA? 
A. Do I know when? 
Q. How? 
A How? I don't know specifically, no. 
(Conf R. 92, Gwartney Depo, p. 159, L. 15 -p. 161, L. 15.) 
Syringa does not challenge the Letter of Intent or the identical and lawful SBPOs issued 
to Qwest and ENA on January 28, 2009 because they did not split the lEN Project. Syringa 
does, however, challenge the unlawful amended SBPOs because they did split the Project. 
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(c) Syringa's Standing Is Not Defeated by the Failure to Challenge the 
Amended SBPOs. 
Neither Idaho Code § 67-5733 nor any other Idaho purchasing statute provides a post-
contract administrative remedy that supplants Syringa's right to bring an action under Idaho 
Code § 10-1202. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a bar to litigation when, as in 
this case, there are no administrative remedies to exhaust. See Fuchs v. State ofldaho, 
Department ofldaho State Police, Bureau ofAlcohol Beverage Control, 152 Idaho 626, 272 P.3d 
1257 (2012); Lochsa Falls, L.L. C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 9631 (2009); (See also 
Opening Brief, pp. 32-36.) 
The State Respondents have identified no statute that affords a post-contract amendment 
administrative remedy, offered no defense of the district court ruling that the "amendments were 
effectively the awards" (R. 1659; Opening Brief, pp. 34-36), and offered no response to 
Syringa's analysis other than to caJl it an irrelevant red herring. The State Respondents have, by 
their failure to present any authority or analysis on this point, conceded the issue. Syringa had 
no administrative remedies to exhaust and clearly has standing to challenge the amended SBPOs. 
The summary judgment dismissing Counts Two and Three of Syringa's Complaint 
should, therefore, be reversed and the claims remanded. 
B. The Existence and Breach of the Teaming Agreement Present Issues That Can Only 
be Resolved by a Jury. 
1. The Teaming Agreement was Complete in its Material Terms. 
The Respondents wrongly assert that the Teaming Agreement lacked "definite and 
material terms, such as price, and because it expressly contemplated the need to execute a 
subsequent agreement." (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 13, Qwest's Brief, pp. 3-5.) The 
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Respondents are wrong because the T earning Agreement contained all the material terms, 
including a process for establishing Syringa's price to ENA, that were necessary. The 
Respondents are also wrong because they conflate Syringa's price to ENA with ENA's price to 
the State. (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 14; Qwest's Brief, pp. 3-5, 18-19.) 
(a) The Cost of Syringa's Services to ENA was Firm, was Not Dependent 
on EN A's Cost to the State, and Is in the Record. 
The Teaming Agreement detailed the obligations ofENA and Syringa with respect to 
their joint e±Torts to obtain a prime contract and their respective performance obligations if the 
ENA Proposal resulted in a prime contract. Specific pricing did not need to be included within 
the four comers of the Teaming Agreement because the "price" for Syringa's connectivity 
services to ENA was required to be provided by Syringa to ENA by~ 2(c) of the Teaming 
Agreement. That price provided by Syringa on January 8 and 9, 2009 was accepted by ENA and 
became a part of the Teaming Agreement. (R. 1794- 1795, Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7- p. 95, 
L. 22; 1797-1801, LoweDepo., p. 174, L. 21-p. 178, L. 7; AffidavitofKevinJohnson, 
R. Conf. pp. 514 582.) 
Paragraph 2(c) of the Teaming Agreement required Syringa to "provide such input, 
review and information into the Proposal as is required to complete all requirements of the 
Request for Proposal." (R. p. 576.) ENA's admission that the Teaming Agreement was 
"unquestionably complete concerning the parties' efforts to obtain the prime contract" is an 
acknowledgement that it received and used Syringa's pricing in the preparation of its response to 
the RFP. (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 18.) 
ENA's misdirection on this issue arises from its conflation of the Syringa price to ENA 
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with ENA's price to the State. The two are separate and distinct. Syringa's price to ENA is the 
subject ofthe Affidavit of Kevin Johnson (R. Conf. 514-582) and was a firm "wholesale" price 
that broke the connectivity services Syringa was to provide to ENA into separately priced 
component parts. ENA's price to the State, on the other hand, was a "retail" price for 
everything, including E-Rate service required to provide the lEN "end to end" solution. That 
price was calculated by ENA. 
ENA tries to hide the fact that Syringa's price to ENA was determined as a part of the 
preparation and submission ofENA's response to the RFP by stating that the RFP was not 
intended to specify the actual needs of the schools for the lEN and, therefore, the total price was 
not known. This is true, but irrelevant. ENA's long explanation of the process by which the 
amount of services required would be determined (ENA's Amended Brief, pp. 14-15) is 
irrelevant because the key element to lEN pricing was not total price, but per unit price. ENA's 
explanation is also irrelevant because Syringa's price to ENA was not dependent upon ENA's 
price to the State- Syringa was committed to provide as much, or as little connectivity as ENA 
required, at its stated price. 
Syringa's pricing to ENA consisted of three components (1) backbone; (2) internet 
access; and (3) local access or "last mile". Syringa provided ENA a flat rate Non-Recurring 
Charge (NRC) of$15,000 and a flat rate Monthly Recurring Charge (MRC) of$83,400 for 
backbone and variable, "per unit" rates for internet access and local access to the locations listed 
in the RFP as Phase 1 sites. (Affidavit of J. Kevin Johnson, Conf. R. 516; see also Exhibits 3 
and 5, Conf. R. 527-533 and 539-582.) The Syringa rate to ENA for internet access was $42.50 
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per mbps and the Syringa rate to ENA for local access was contained on two spreadsheets that 
addressed NRC and MRC for each lEN location. The flat rates to be charged to ENA for 
backbone would start upon the first request for services by EN A. The variable rate to be charged 
to ENA for internet access would start upon request by ENA that designated the site and the 
amount of capacity desired at $42.50 per mbps. The rate to be charged to ENA for local access 
would start on request by ENA to activate a specific lEN location (subject only to downward 
adjustment pursuant to Section 3( c) if another provider offered a better price for "last mile"). 
These firm rates were significantly less and were included within the rates set out in the ENA 
Cost Proposal and were not dependent upon the price paid to ENA by the State. (Rex Miller 
email string, R. Conf. 139-141.) 
Qwest argues that the Teaming Agreement was incomplete because it failed to address 
how ENA and Syringa would divide the $571,000 monthly recurring charge. (Qwest's Brief, 
p. 19.) As noted above, there was no need for a "division" ofthe $571,000 MRC between ENA 
and Syringa. Syringa would be paid, based on the rates it provided to ENA on January 8 and 9, 
2009, for the backbone, internet access and local access services it provided to ENA for use by 
the lEN. Beyond that, Syringa had no claim to the monies to be paid to ENA by the State. The 
$571,000 MRC number was, in short, a number created by ENA to cover the services included 
within its response to the RFP. 
ENA and Qwest also try to create confusion by suggesting Mr. Lowe testified in 
deposition that ENA and Syringa had not agreed on price. (Qwest's brief, pp. 4-5, 19; ENA's 
Amended Brief, pp. 13-14.) In fact, Mr. Lowe testified that Syringa gave ENA a fixed price: 
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A. In order to put in a fixed price bid, we had to go out and get 
quotes for the last mile. If you look at the pricing schedules that we 
gave ENA as part of the RFP response, they're broken down into two 
basic categories. One was a core charge. And that core charge is 
what we were going to charge ENA for the backbone. And in the 
teaming agreement, it was one backbone. 
The lion's share of the charge was access charges. And we 
went out to the best of our ability to find various suppliers, Qwest 
Wholesale, Verizon, Frontier, Cable One, Direct Communications, 
anybody and everybody. We went out to find what we believed at 
that time the lowest cost last mile. And then we presented that with 
our markup as a price to ENA. 
So, ENA received core charges and access charges as a part of 
the fixed price that we gave them. So, we had a solution and we knew 
that the solution would not exceed at least the access charges. But we 
left the ability in the teaming agreement for ENA to come back in. 
Because this thing -- this thing went from an RFP let of December 
15th to an RFP response of January 12th. 
Q. Right. 
A. We had less than a month. We did a lot of work to come up 
with what we believed to be the lowest cost. We left the provisions in 
the teaming agreement so that once the award was made and once we 
initiated on this platform, if ENA could find a cheaper access provider 
that was available to them, then great. Syringa Networks would have 
first right of refusal if it matched the price, matched the technical 
capabilities, et cetera. Those provisions were left in place to protect 
Idaho's taxpayers. We went to great length, I went to great length in 
my conversations with Jason Kreizenbeck, in the teaming agreement 
wording, and intent of what Syringa Networks wanted to do to protect 
Idaho's taxpayers. 
(Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7- p. 95, L. 22; R. 1793-1795.) 
Mr. Lowe also testified, consistent with the fixed price given to ENA, that cost was 
known; what was not known was the logistics. (Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7- p. 95, L. 22; R. 1793-
1795; R. Lowe Depo, p. 174, L. 21 - 178, L. 7; R. 1796-1801.) The subsequent service 
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agreement contemplated by the Teaming Agreement "'was for the logistics of what this Teaming 
Agreement defined as a work- you know, as a work body should the lEN Alliance win." 
The RFP reserved the right to decide the amount of services that would be purchased. 
The parties did not know, therefore, how the project would unfold, but they did know the type 
and cost of services Syringa was required to make available. The logistics of implementation, 
including billing, depended upon how the work would be awarded by the State. To address these 
logistics, the Teaming Agreement provided that the parties shall execute a "partnership 
agreement as specified in this Agreement that would include any required flow-down provisions 
or other appropriate terms similar to those set forth in the prime contract." Syringa's price to 
ENA, on the other hand, was known and accepted pursuant to the process required by~ 2( c) of 
the Teaming Agreement before the ENA Proposal was submitted. The Respondents' contentions 
to the contrary are inconsistent with the record and without merit. 
2. The Certainty of the Material Terms of the Teaming Agreement is :Kot 
Defeated by the Absence of Detail on Other, Non-Material Terms. 
ENA alleges the Teaming Agreement was incomplete because it did not contain 
information about how orders would be placed, how billing would occur, how workflow issues 
would be addressed and how labor would be divided. (ENA's Amended Brief, pp. 13-14.) How 
labor would be divided and how workflow issues would be handled are, contrary to ENA's 
argument, specifically addressed in paragraphs 3.B and 3.C of the Teaming Agreement (R. 576-
578 at 577). How orders would be placed and how billing would occur are, on the other hand, 
logistical terms whose absence does not prevent the enforcement of an agreement. 
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A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain 
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to reasonable certainty. Giacobbi 
Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983); Anderson v. Whipple, 71 
Idaho 112, 123, 227 P.2d 351 (1951); Farber v. Dewey-Davis Estate, Inc., 883 Idaho 394, 398, 
364 P.2d 173 (1961). The absence of detail in non-material terms, on the other hand, does not 
render a contract unenforceable. 
This Court addressed similar facts in Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho 1 73, 540 P .2d 13 52 
( 197 5), which concerned the enforcement of an oral agreement to pay the purchase price of farm 
machinery over time. As here, appellant Huck contended that the contract was so vague, 
indefinite and uncertain that it could not be enforced. Huck argued that there was no agreement 
(1) whether the balance was to be paid in installments or in a lump sum; (2) when each 
installment was due (assuming the balance was to be paid in installments); or (3) upon a final 
maturity date for the entire indebtedness to be paid. This Court rejected Huck's arguments and 
found that the deferred payment agreement, which was for a specific amount and an interest rate 
"equivalent to that charged by the Southern Idaho Production Credit Association" was 
sufficiently certain in its terms and requirements to render it enforceable. In so doing, this Court 
emphasized that only reasonable certainly is required: 
As a general rule if a contract is so vague and indefinite that the intent 
of the parties cannot be ascertained therefrom, it is unenforceable. In 
applying this rule, COliTIS will])ot hold the contracting parties to a 
§t<indard of absolute certainty relative to every detail of a contract. 
Rather only reasonable certainty is necessary before a contract will be 
given legal effect. (emphasis added). 
97 Idaho at 178, 540 P.2d 1357 (1975). 
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This Court also explicitly recognized in Huck, supra, that the law "does not favor, but 
leans against, the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty, and it will, if feasible, so 
construe the agreements to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if that can be 
ascertained." I d., quoting WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 813, § 1424 (3d ed. 1968). If the parties 
have expressed their intent to be bound and if the terms are reasonably certain such that the 
Court can determine the parties' bargain, the agreement is enforceable. The Teaming Agreement 
is such an agreement. 
3. Anticipation of the Need for a Future Service Agreement Does Not Render 
the Teaming Agreement Unenforceable. 
ENA argues that the T earning Agreement was not complete because it anticipated the 
need for a subsequent service agreement and contends that, "a contract that demonstrates an 
intent to be bound by a future contract is the definition of an agreement to agree." ENA cites no 
authority for this incorrect statement of the law. A so called "agreement to agree is one which is 
not sufficiently complete in its material terms to enable the trier of fact to determine (1) what 
acts are to be performed and (2) when performance is complete. Dale's Service Co. v. Jones, 96 
Idaho 662, 664, 534 P .2d 1102, 1104 ( 197 5). The phrase "agreement to agree" is not itself a test 
of enforceability, but is a conclusion reached by application of the proper test. Whether an 
agreement contemplates a further written agreement is not determinative of the existence of a 
current agreement. As stated in ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc.: 
In many cases, the finalized subcontract between the parties to a 
teaming agreement will specifically enumerate the scope of 
obligations for each party contingent upon the prime contractor 
winning the RFP so that there is usually little need to enforce the 
teaming agreement itself. Often, however, the parties may reach an 
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understanding to team, but fail to execute a subcontract as anticipated 
in the teaming agreement. As with most other "preliminary 
agreements" precedent to an executed contract ... the question arises 
whether the teaming agreement itself, absent an executed subcontract, 
may constitute the basis for contractual liability. Courts have 
generally allowed such a cause of action in contract based solely on 
the teaming agreement, but not without overcoming two major 
obstacles: (1) the intent of the parties to enter into a binding 
contractual relationship; and (2) the existence of sufficient objective 
criteria to enforce. 
* * * 
The fact that the parties never finalized an implementing subcontract 
is usually not fatal to enforcing the teaming agreement on its own-if 
the parties intended the teaming agreement itself to constitute a 
binding agreement that enumerated definite terms ofbehavior 
governing the parties during, or even after, the binding process. Such 
terms might include the subcontractor's assistance in the prime 
contractor's proposal in return for the prime contractor's delivery of 
an agreeable subcontract. Or, the parties might promise to work 
exclusively with each other in preparing the bid for the government 
contract. Of course, if the parties to a teaming agreement do not wish 
to create binding obligations before executing an ultimate subcontract, 
they need only say so. (Internal citations omitted and emphasis 
added.) 
ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666-667 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
ENA argues the ATACS case is distinguishable because Trans World Airlines, the prime 
contractor, received a contract for the entire project while ENA did not. This distinction is 
immaterial. As noted above, Syringa provided firm pricing to ENA that allowed ENA to include 
per unit and site specific pricing in its response to the RFP. The exact amount, sequence and 
location of services the State required was not material to the Teaming Agreement. Syringa 
- 17-
agreed to provide connectivity to ENA at its stated price without regard to the number of sites 
selected for service, the volume requested, or the price received by ENA. 
Qwest asserts the A TA CS case is "unhelpful" arguing that under Pennsylvania law "the 
omission of an essential term in a contract, such as price does not vitiate contract formation .... " 
ATACS at p. 667. (Qwest's Brief, p. 20.) Qwest misrepresents the ATACS court by quoting only 
a portion of the subject sentence from ATACS. The entire quote, which is consistent with Idaho 
law, reads: "Indeed, the omission of an essential term in a contract such as price does not vitiate 
contract formation if the parties otherwise manifested their mutual asset to the agreement and the 
terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite." (emphasis added). !d. 
The Teaming Agreement was sufficiently definite even though a price was not included 
within its four corners because Syringa's price to ENA was to be determined, and was in fact 
determined, through the parties' performance of their ,]2( c) obligations in submitting a response 
to the RFP. The details concerning the logistics of billing and related matters were also tied to 
the correlating details of State terms and conditions so that the reference to "flow down 
provisions" was sufficient to identify a process for completing these non-material terms. 
4. The Teaming Agreement Was Not Rendered Unenforceable By The RFP 
Reservation of the Right to Make Multiple Awards. 
ENA incorrectly asserts that ENA and Syringa could not contract beyond the submission 
of the ENA Proposal because the "RFP reserved for the State the right to split the award". 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 1875-79; RFP ,]2.0; ENA's Amended Brief, p. 16.) This argument is without 
merit for at least three reasons: 
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First, the RFP did not reserve a right to "split" the award. DOA reserved the right to 
make a multiple award to up to four providers but specifically discouraged bids on part, but not 
all of the lEN Project. 1 The RFP also required pricing to be submitted on a per unit basis so that 
a multiple award could be accommodated. (R. 77, RFP Section 10.0.) 
Second, the State is empowered to make multiple awards only for the same or similar 
property and could not split theE-Rate and connectivity services. The reference to four 
providers in the RFP could only lawfully mean awarding multiple contracts for the end-to-end 
solution sought by the RFP (e.g., one provider for northern Idaho, one provider for southwest 
Idaho and one provider for eastern Idaho). 
Third, the DOA did not split the award when it issued the first SBPOs. It issued identical 
contracts to ENA and to Qwest for the entire lEN Project which included E-Rate and 
connectivity. This original ENA SBPO was a "prime contract" as defined in the Teaming 
Agreement. 
5. The ENA Proposal Was Not Rejected by the Letter of Intent. 
ENA claims the Teaming Agreement terminated by its terms on January 20, 2009 
because "the State expressly rejected the lEN Alliance's offer to have Syringa provide the 
connectivity portion of the lEN on a statewide basis." (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 20.) ENA's 
argument is nonsense. 
The argument is nonsense because despite the "lEN Alliance" name, the "lEN Alliance" 
response to the RFP was ENA's proposal and ENA was to be the party contracting with the 
SeeR. 1882, RFP § 3.2; R. 150-151, RFP A-15; see also R. 1892, RFP § 5.3. 
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State. The statement is also nonsense because DOA did not expressly reject the ENA Proposal 
and said nothing about rejecting Syringa connectivity on January 20, 2009. In fact, DOA 
accepted the ENA Proposal and the Qwest proposal and issued identical SBPOs for the entire 
lEN Project to each on January 28, 2009. Moreover, the acceptance of two proposals and the 
issuance of two SBPOs was not a rejection of the ENA Proposal, but was, as discussed above, an 
I.C. § 67-5718A multiple award that was contemplated by the RFP. 
ENA seeks to mislead the Court into concluding that the parties intended their 
participation in the lEN Project to be "all or nothing" by citing to statements of Greg Lowe, the 
Syringa CEO, which acknowledge what no one disputes: that the Proposal was for an end-to-end 
solution. IfENA and Syringa had not proposed an end-to-end solution, the Proposal would not 
have been responsive. (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 22.) ENA's deception lies in its attempt to 
equate the phrase "end-to-end solution" with "state-wide solution". None of the record citations 
provided by ENA support its statement that the ENA Proposal was to be the sole statewide end-
to-end solution required by the RFP. For example, at page 23 of its Response Brief, ENA cites 
the Affidavit of Greg Lowe for the proposition that the EN A/Syringa Proposal was for a "state-
wide" solution. (R. 568.) In fact, Greg Lowe testified: 
13. Syringa and Education Networks of America, Inc. combined, 
in response to recommendation in section 3.2 of the lEN RFP quoted 
above, for the purpose of preparing a response to the lEN RFP and to 
provide the "total end-to-end service support solution" solution the 
RFP requested. 
(R. 568.) The January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent accepted two proposals for end-to-end solutions 
in a fashion that was consistent with the RFP and did not, therefore, vary from the ENA 
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Proposal. The acceptance did not vary from the offer. The Letter of Intent and the first SBPOs 
were actually an acceptance ofENA's Proposal. 
6. The Teaming Agreement Was Never Terminated by Rejection. 
ENA argues that the Teaming Agreement "terminated by its own terms" because the 
ENA (lEN Alliance) proposal was "twice rejected". (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 20.) It then 
recites, but subsequently ignores the language or,[ 2(h) of the Teaming Agreement that concerns 
termination. 
Paragraph 2(h) of the Teaming Agreement states, "This agreement will terminate without 
liability upon any of the following events:" It then lists a series of terminating events, including 
,I 2(h)(i) "the customer formally and finally rejects the Proposal or cancels the Project"; ,I 2(h)(ii) 
"Either party notifies the other that it is ceasing its efforts with respect to the Project, however 
such a notification shall not absolve either party of its obligations under Section 2( e) and 2(g) 
above"; and other events such as (iv) "mutual written agreement" that don't bear on the issues in 
this case. The list of terminating events makes it apparent that the nature of the terminating 
event has a direct impact on the post-termination obligations of the parties. 
None of the obligations of the Teaming Agreement remain following termination because 
"the customer formally and finally rejects the Proposal or cancels the Project" under ,I 2(h)(i) or 
the agreement is terminated by mutual written agreement under ,[2(h)(iv). The ,[2(e) obligation 
not to compete, or assist others to compete for the Project and the ,I 2(g) obligation not to 
disclose Confidential Information, on the other hand, survive unilateral termination under 
,I 2(h)(ii). The listing of five separate terminating events with two different kinds of post 
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termination obligations makes it clear that the parties placed significance on the language used in 
each. 
The DOA decision to make a lawful multiple award (as suggested by the Letter oflntent 
and the first SBPO) was not a rejection of the ENA Proposal because it would allow ENA (with 
Syringa as subcontractor) to compete against Qwest site by site to provide "all services" to 
selected schools and libraries under I.C. § 67-5718A (3). The split award (i.e, the amended 
SBPOs), on the other hand, could have constituted a common law rejection of the ENA Proposal 
if the ENA Proposal had not previously been accepted by the original SBPOs and if the amended 
SBPOs did not violate I. C. § 67-5718A. Further, paragraph 2(h)(i) of the Teaming Agreement 
did not provide that the Agreement terminated on any rejection. Paragraph 2(h)(i) of the 
Teaming Agreement requires that a rejection be both formal and final. 
Contract interpretation principles require the court construing a written instrument to 
consider the instrument as a whole and to give meaning to all of the provisions of the writing to 
the extent possible. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 748, 9 P.3d 1204, 
1214 (2000); Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 960 
(2000); Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Pro_fossional Business Services, Inc., 119 
Idaho 558, 565,808 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1991). The plain meaning ofthe word "fonnally" does 
not mean a rejection that occurs by operation oflaw. The word "finally" indicates that the 
parties anticipated there could be give and take between ENA and the DOA before a final 
contract was entered or EN A's proposal is "fonnally and finally" rejected. 
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Construction of the Teaming Agreement as a whole reveals that the parties made a 
distinction between formal and final rejection by the customer under paragraph 2(h)(i) and 
voltmtary cessation of efforts under paragraph 2(h)(ii). If there is a formal and final rejection, all 
obligations of the parties under the agreement cease. If, on the other hand, one of the parties 
believes that the Proposal has been rejected and "ceases its efforts with respect to the Project", it 
is still obligated, by the Teaming Agreement, to refrain from competing for the Project and not to 
disclose Confidential Information. 
Finally, the arguments made by ENA's lawyers ignore the inconsistent conduct and 
statements of ENA leadership. ENA executive Bob Collie dealt extensively with DOA and with 
Syringa concerning the Teaming Agreement and the lEN Project. Bob Collie also attended most, 
if not all of the lEN meetings with Qwest that culminated in the amended SBPOs. Mr. Collie 
treated the Teaming Agreement as if it was still effective as late as July, 2009. When Greg Lowe 
complained to Mr. Collie on July 11, 2009, that he had been told by a state employee that ENA 
had made the choice to use Qwest, Mr. Collie responded the same day by saying: 
ENA has asked multiple times to have the ability to quote circuits 
from multiple providers and have been told no each time. We have 
also shared our teaming agreement with the state and have discussed 
it in detail with OCIO and Admin leadership so there is no possibility 
that they are confused about where we stand on the matter. 
Furthermore, we have stated numerous times that the current 
environment is not our preferred, normal or typical manner of doing 
business nor is it the way that we bid in response to the State's RFP. 
* * * 
We continue to stand behind our teaming agr~ment, however at this 
point we have no ability to implement its functions as we do not have 
the ability to award a backbone or circuits outside of the state's 
direction. (emphasis added) 
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(July 11, 2009 Collie email, R. Conf. 142-143.) 
Mr. Collie reiterated his understanding that the Teaming Agreement was still in effect on 
July 27, 2009 when he again wrote to Syringa CEO Greg Lowe asking Syringa to agree to the 
use of its circuits in Salmon. Mr. Collie stated: 
We completely understand the need to protect Syringa's interests, but 
your action last week does focus our attention on exactly how E)~" A 
might proceed with its limited portion of this project since Syringa 
has never formally declared the teaming agreement to have been 
tenninated. Given the importance of the IEN to the State and your 
continued support for ENA's continued preparations to implement its 
assigned portion of this project, we assume that everyone 
acknowledges that Syringa agrees with ENA moving forward in 
accordance with its purchase order. As with the Salmon School 
District, ENA intends to continue to press the State to use the 
backbone offered by Syringa and its members' local loop options 
despite the rejection of those portions of the RFP. We believe over 
time we will prevail. 
(July 11, 2009 Collie email, R. Conf. 165.) 
At a minimum, genuine issues of material fact exist whether the issuance of a multiple 
award as evidenced by the January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent and the January 28, 2009 SBPOs 
was a "rejection" of the ENA Proposal as contemplated by the parties in the Teaming 
Agreement. The February 26, 2009 amended SBPOs that "split" the award could not constitute a 
rejection of the Proposal because the ENA Proposal had already been accepted by the original 
SBPOs. 
7. ENA's "Alternative Grounds" Do Not Support Entry of Summary 
Judgment. 
ENA argues that its obligation to Syringa was excused because the DOA acted 
unilaterally when it split the award by issuing the amended SBPOs. ENA relies on two different 
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legal theories to support this argument. First, ENA asserts it was excused on the theory that the 
award of connectivity work to ENA was a condition precedent to its Teaming Agreement 
obligation to work with Syringa. Second, ENA argues that the alleged DOA unilateral decision 
to split the award excuses ENA's performance under the doctrine of frustration of purpose. 
In support of these theories, ENA states that "Syringa can point to no evidence that 
creates any issue of fact that the State's decision regarding the Amendments was not unilateral." 
ENA Response Brief at p. 25. ENA's assertion that the DOA acted unilaterally is dead wrong. 
The DOA approached ENA after the original SBPO and asked ENA to work with Qwest. ENA 
was under no obligation to acquiesce to DOA's request. Instead, and contrary to its obligations 
under the Teaming Agreement, Bob Collie told Greg Zickau that the Teaming Agreement was 
not an impediment and that ENA would do whatever the state asked ENA to do. (R. p. 2399, 
Zickau Depo., p. 102, L. 6- p. 105, L. 25.). Consistent with doing whatever the state asked, Mr. 
Collie met Qwest employee Clint Berry and ENA employee Bob Collie met on February 9, 2009 
to discuss the pricing Qwest would charge for the very services ENA had agreed to acquire from 
Syringa. (R. Conf. p. 166, Miller email; R. Conf. p. 156, Berry email.). ENA also met with 
DOA officials and Qwest representatives multiple times in the interval between the original and 
amended SBPOs. The record is devoid of any evidence that ENA told Syringa it was working 
with Qwest. In fact, E~A did not even tell Syringa that the amended SBPOs had been entered. 
As late as July of2009, ENA told Syringa it "continued to stand behind" the Teaming 
Agreement. (R. Conf. pp. 142-146.) ENA's duplicity is strong evidence that its excuses are not 
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raised in good faith. In short, ENA' s assertion that DOA acted unilaterally is simply not 
supported by the record. 
Because the record contains evidence that ENA facilitated or at least cooperated with the 
DOA in splitting the Project through the amended SBPOs, neither the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose nor ENA's condition precedent argument excuses its performance of the Teaming 
Agreement. ENA argues that the doctrine of frustration of purpose applies alleging that the 
"State's decision to issue the award to ENA and Qwest frustrated the object of the Teaming 
Agreement." (ENA Brief, p. 28.) A quick examination of the argument, however, reveals that 
ENA is actually making an impossibility of performance argument and, in fact, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals case ENA cites is actually an impossibility of performance case.2 A promisor is 
relieved of its promise only if the promisor was not at fault for the event causing the "frustration 
of purpose" or making performance impossible. (See Rstmt. 2d Contract§ 265; see also 
17A Am Jur 2d, Section 660.) 
Because ENA participated in the circumstance that allegedly prevents its performance, 
neither the defense of impossibility of performance nor frustration of purpose is available to it. 
Moreover, ENA made no effort to "surmount the obstacle" to performance. In fact, to the 
contrary, ENA invited DOA's splitting of the award by telling the DOA it need not worry about 
ENA's Teaming Agreement. 
ENA cites Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 896 P.2d 989 (Ct. App. 1995) in support of its frustration of 
purpose argument, but Suthemier is actually an impossibility of performance case. 127 Idaho at 85, 896 P.2d at 
993. This court explained the distinction between the two defenses Twin Harbors Lumber Company v. 
Carrico, 92 Idaho 343, 442 P. 2d 753 (1968), stating that the doctrine of impossibility excusing performance of 
a contract provides generally that if the existence of a specific thing is essentially necessary for the performance 
of a promise in the bargain, the promise will be discharged if the thing subsequently is not in existence in time 
for performance. 92 Idaho at 348, 442 P. 2d at 758. 
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For this same reason, ENA cannot escape its contractual obligation to Syringa on its 
theory that the award of connectivity to ENA was a condition precedent to ENA's obligation to 
use Syringa for that work. [W]hen the happening of the event is within the exclusive or partial 
control of the party whose obligation is conditioned upon the event, its nonoccurrence will not 
always excuse the obligor's performance." Wade Baker & Sons Farms, 136 Idaho 922, 935, 42 
P.3d 715, 718 (Idaho App. 2002). (emphasis added). "Where a party has control over the 
happening of a condition precedent, he must make a reasonable effort to cause the condition to 
happen." Dengler, 141 Idaho at 129, 106 P.3d at 454; Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 474, 
147 P.3d 100, 106; Schlueterv. Nelson, 74 Idaho 396,399,263 P.2d 386,387 (1953)). Where a 
party is the cause of the failure of a condition precedent, he cannot take advantage of the failure. 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 129, 106 P.3d 449, 454 (2005) (citing 
Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 133, 391 P.2d 344, 348 (1964)). In this case the record 
contains evidence from which a jury could reasonably determine that ENA participated in the 
DOA decision to award connectivity to Qwest. ENA had the power to refuse DO A's attempts. 
Not only could ENA have simply told the DOA "no," ENA had significant power and position 
once it was named theE-rate provider. It would have been entirely appropriate for each to 
exercise that power and position consistent with its contractual obligations to Syringa. 
C. Summary Judgment in Favor of Gwartney and Zickau was Improper. 
The State Respondents argue that the district court should have granted summary 
judgment in favor of Gwartney and Zickau because Syringa's Complaint failed to allege that 
Gwartney and Zickau were not entitled to the immunity provided by Idaho Code§ 6-904(3). 
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The State Respondents further argue that Syringa did not point to sufficient evidence to 
overcome the presumption of immunity. The State Respondents' arguments are without merit. 
1. Syringa Was Not Required to Plead the Absence of Immunity. 
The State Respondents argue that the Court should affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to Gwartney and Zickau because the Complaint does not allege facts to 
overcome the State Defendants' statutory immunity. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 26.) This 
appeal, however, is not from a Motion to Dismiss that challenges the sufficiency of the 
pleadings. This appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to overcome summary 
judgment. 
Nonetheless, "a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses. 
61A Am Jur 2d Pleading§ 177; see id. § 136. Quite the opposite-a defendant bears the burden 
of alleging and proving an affirmative defense, such as statutory immunity. See, e.g., Stuard v. 
Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704,249 P.3d 1156, 1159 (2011) (defendant must prove affirmative 
defense); S. Griffin Canst., Inc. v. Lewiston, 125 Idaho 181, 184, 16 P.3d 278,281 (2000) 
(immunity is an affirmative defense); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 
(1986); Fuhriman v. Dep 't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 483 (2007). Thus, the 
Complaint is not deficient-Syringa was not required to anticipate and overcome the State 
Respondents' as-yet-unpleaded defense ofimmunity. 3 
As noted below, Plaintiff produced evidence overcoming the State Respondents' immunity defense. Yet the 
State Respondents ask this Court to ignore that evidence and to affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on the grounds that the Complaint failed to state a claim. While the State Respondents' argument is 
technically preserved, Syringa respectfully submits that the Court should review the summary judgment 
decision before it. Should the Court entertain the State Respondents' argument that the Complaint failed to state 
a claim because it failed to allege the absence of immunity, Syringa should be provided the opportunity to 
amend the Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15 to conform to the evidence presented on summary judgment. 
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The State respondents rely upon Myers v. Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 559 P.2d 1136 (1977), 
in support of their argument that Syringa was required to plead the facts (such as malice) that are 
necessary to overcome statutory immunity. The citation, however, is misleading. Myers was an 
action for malicious prosecution. The allegation that the "defendant was actuated by malice" is 
an essential element of the prima facia case of the tort of malicious prosecution. 98 Idaho at 
169, 559 P.2d at 113 7. The court properly dismissed the complaint in Myers tor failure to allege 
the elements of the underlying tort claim; not for failure to plead facts that anticipated the 
affirmative defense of immunity. Myers is not apposite and Syringa is not required to plead 
"malice", criminal intent, or other facts necessary to overcome Gwartney and Zickau' s alleged 
affirmative defense of immunity. In other words, Syringa was under no obligation to anticipate 
and refute DOA's affinnative defense. 
Even if Syringa was required to allege that Gwartney and Zickau acted outside the course 
and scope of their employment, with malice, or with criminal intent, reasonable inferences drawn 
from the Complaint meet this requirement. Count Four of Syringa's Complaint realleged 
foregoing paragraphs of the Complaint, which included paragraphs 40 (Gwartney and Zickau 
agreed with Qwest officials to contract with Qwest despite the evaluation team conclusions), 45 
through 50 (Gwartney and Zickau instructed ENA and others not to use Syringa for IEN 
implementation regardless of the competitive bid process, consideration of price and other 
statutory factors), and 69 through 76 (Gwartney and Zickau conspired with Qwest to amend the 
IEN Purchase Orders in violation ofidaho Code§ 67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an 
-29-
acquisition award in violation ofldaho Code §67-5726). At a minimum, these allegations 
support an inference of criminal intent. 
Criminal intent is present when "the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts. 
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296, 303 (2002) citing State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 
406,788 P.2d 220,221 (1990). "The word 'intent' as used in criminal statutes does not mean the 
intent to commit a crime, but the intent knowingly to perform the interdicted act." State v. 
Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 3 7 5 P .2d 536 (1962) (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. City of 
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,182,731 P.2d 171,187 (1987) ("[criminal intent] involves the 
intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse.") 
(emphasis added). The allegation that Gwartney and Zickau conspired to split the lEN award in 
violation ofldaho Code §67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an acquisition award in violation 
of Idaho Code §67 -5726 supports an inference of criminal intent in that they knowingly split the 
lEN Project and knowingly excluded Syringa from providing the services it contracted to 
provide in the Teaming Agreement.4 
The same allegations support an inference of malice as a form of criminal intent plus ill 
without regard to intent to injure. Anderson, supra. 
Syringa's complaint is fully sufficient. 
The district court erroneously ruled, without citation to authority, that Syringa was precluded from relying upon 
the issuance of the amended SBPOs and violation ofldaho Code§ 67-5718A as the "proscribed act" for 
purposes of criminal intent because it had concluded that Syringa was barred, by failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies from challenging the amended SBPOs. The State Respondents have not addressed this 
issue which was raised by Syringa in its Opening Brief. (Syringa's Opening Brief, p 48). 
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2. Gwartney and Zickau's Claims of Immunity Present Genuine Issues of 
.Material Fact. 
The State Respondents claim that Syringa failed to present facts sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption that the conduct of 
Gwartney and Zickau was immune under Idaho Code§ 6-904(3). While it is true that Idaho 
Code§ 6-904(3) creates a "rebuttable presumption that any act or admission of employee within 
the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment 
and without malice or criminal intent'", the standard is not so onerous as the State Respondents 
contend. Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho, 509, 519, 50 P.3d 1004, 1014 (2002). 
The State Respondents and the district court overstate the burden of overcoming the 
Idaho Code § 6-904 presumption by misreading Boise Tower Assoc. LLC v. Hoagland, 14 7 
Idaho 774, 784,215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009), for the proposition that the burden is "particularly 
high." (R. 2583.) That case did not change the evidentiary burden for overcoming the 
presumption of Idaho Code § 6-904; it simply noted that the burden on a plaintiff challenging an 
act of a state employee is "particularly high" because of the presumption. The district court 
statement in this regard that "Syringa must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption" is in error. (R. 2583.) Syringa was 
required only to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
exceptions to immunity. Whether the facts are sufficient is for the jury to decide. 
The State Respondents do not dispute, but do not state clearly, that the Idaho Code § 6-
904 presumption is rebutted if the subject employee acts outside the course and scope ofhis or 
her employment; or acts with malice; or acts with criminal intent. Put simply, a state employee 
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is not immune from liability for tortious conduct undertaken outside the scope of employment. 
Similarly a state employee is not immune from liability for tortious conduct undertaken with 
criminal intent, or undertaken with malice. The district court erred to the extent that it treated the 
exceptions conjunctively. (R. 2584.) 
Syringa acknowledges it was required to come forward with admissible evidence to 
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact whether Gwartney and Zickau acted 
with criminal intent or malice and asserts that the evidence is in the Record. By the same token, 
the Record does not present evidence that Gwartney and Zickau were acting outside the scope of 
their employment when they acted with Qwest to amend the lEN Purchase Orders in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an acquisition award in violation ofldaho 
Code§ 67-5726. 
The record is replete with admissible evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer 
that Gwartney and Zickau acted with criminal intent to violate the requirements of Idaho Code 
§ 67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an acquisition award in violation ofldaho Code§ 67-
5726. Much of that evidence is circumstantial; but direct evidence is rarely available to prove 
intent. Highland Enterprises, Inc., v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340, 986 P.2d 996, 1006 (1999) 
(What motivates a person to act is seldom susceptible of direct proof; intent may be established 
by inference as well as by direct proof.) Further, circumstantial evidence that is admissible is 
sufficient to create a material issue of fact. See Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 
249 P.3d 857 (2011); Banner Life Ins. Co., v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 
117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). 
- 32-
Evidence of criminal intent or malice on the part of Mr. Gwartney begins with his 
admission that he knew, at least as early as January 20, that Qwest would be providing lEN 
connectivity. (Syringa's Opening Brief, pp. 14-15.) This testimony is corroborated by the 
testimony of Qwest employee Clint Berry who testified "I knew all along we (Qwest) were going 
to be providing connectivity" (Syringa's Opening Brief, p. 15.) 
Greg Zickau's testimony to the effect that he recommended making a multiple award 
during the January 16, 2009 telephone call following the completion of the technical evaluation, 
made the decision to award connectivity to Qwest, and doesn't recall who initiated the amended 
SBPOs must be evaluated in light of the foregoing testimony by Mr. Gwartney and Clint Berry 
and raises an inference that Mr. Zickau is a co-conspirator and "team player" whose testimony is 
designed to protected Mr. Gwartney. (See Zickau Depo. P. 179 L. 9- P. 180 L. 2, R. Conf. 108; 
P. 92 L. 5- P. 93 L. 21, R. Conf. 107; P. 76 L. 2- L. 7, R. Conf. 105). 
Gwartney's self-knowledge of guilt may also be inferred from the destruction of evidence 
on his computer. (R. 1991-2011, Affidavit ofMerlyn Clark). Although a question remains 
whether the destruction of Mr. Gwartney's computer files rises to the level of deserving a 
presumptive spoliation instruction, evidence of the fact that Mr. Gwartney's calendars for the 
months of January and February are clean and devoid of appointments unlike all other months is 
unexplained and supports an inference that evidence was destroyed. (Gwartney Depo., p. 286 L. 
2- p. 294, L. 25; R. Conf. 374-375; Gwartney Calendar, R. Conf. 00324- 000362.) 
Further evidence in the record that creates genuine issues of material fact and from which 
a jury could reasonably infer the existence of criminal intent and malice on the part of Gwartney 
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and Zickau is summarized in Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts in Support of Response to 
Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (R. Conf. 1-31) and supported by the 
documents and testimony attached to the Affidavit of David R. Lombardi In Support of 
Plaintiffs Opposition to Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (R. Conf. 73-301 ). This 
evidence proves that Gwartney and Zickau knew about the Teaming Agreement (R. Conf. 5-7); 
that Gwartney threatened to cut Syringa out from lEN business if the Syringa CEO "didn't keep 
his opinions to himself' (R. Conf. 8-9); that at least one of the evaluators believed there was bias 
against Syringa5 (R. Conf. 9-1 0); that ENA officials had the present impression that "Gwartney 
and Zickau "are ... under some kind of need to give Qwest this deal. .. " (R. Conf. 10-11)6; that 
Gwartney and Zickau engaged in multiple closed door meetings with Qwest and ENA they could 
not remember but which resulted in changes to the Strategic Implementation Plan that morphed 
from including Syringa to the total exclusion of Syringa (R. Conf. 11-23); and that the decision 
to make a split award separating E-rate services from cmmectivity services was made before the 
technical evaluation team conducted its evaluation. (R. Conf. 23-27.) 
The record also contains evidence that brings the credibility of Gwartney, Zickau, state 
witnesses Teresa Luna, Mark Little, Laura Hill and ENA witness Bob Collie into question. 
(Plaintiffs Opening Brief, p. 31 ;Exhibits to the Clerk's Record, Roden Exhibits 2 - 3 and 
R. Conf. 488-513). This evidence precludes strict reliance on the printed version of the testimony 
This evidence was erroneously excluded by the district court as inadmissible; it is not hearsay, but is a statement 
of existing state of mind of the declarant under IRE 803(3). 
This evidence was also erroneously excluded by the district court as inadmissible; it is not hearsay, but is either 
an admission of a party opponent (ENA) under IRE 801 (d) or a statement of existing state of mind under 
IRE 803(3). 
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of the above individuals whose demeanor, failures of memory, evasiveness and presentation 
present an issue of credibility that can only be resolved by the jury. 
Summary judgment and dismissal of Count 4 of Syringa's claims against Gwartney and 
Zickau was and would be error. 
D. Genuine Issues of Fact Preclude the Entry of Summary Judgment to Qwest. 
Qwest advances three principal arguments to support the dismissal of Syringa's 
interference claims: (1) ENA and Syringa did not have binding agreement with which Qwest 
could interfere; (2) Qwest's interference with the Teaming Agreement was not "improper" and 
was therefore not actionable; and (3) the DOA acted unilaterally and, therefore, Qwest did not 
actually interfere. 
As to the first point, whether the Teaming Agreement was sufficiently definite in its 
terms to be enforceable presents questions of fact to be resolved by the jury. See Section II. B. 
above. 
Qwest's second point relates to the law and to the facts. On the law, Qwest confuses the 
tort of interference with contract with the tort of interference with prospective economic 
advantage. The tort of interference with contract has four elements: "( 1) the existence of a 
contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference 
causing a breach of the contract; and ( 4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Wesco 
Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 895,243 P.3d 1069, 1083 (2010); see also 
Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974). The tort of 
interference with economic advantage adds an element that the interference must be "wrongful 
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by some means beyond the fact of the interference itself." The Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841, 861 (1992). 
Once the above elements are established, the burden shifts to the defendant to explain the 
interference. Wesco, 895 Idaho at 895, 243, P.3d at 1083. Whether the defendant is able to 
establish justification is evaluated under a multiple factor test summarized in the Restmt. 
(Second) ofTorts at§ 766A. Wesco, 895 Idaho at 895,243, P.3d at 1083. The evaluation of 
these factors is not for the purpose of determining "wrongfulness, but rather "[w]eighing the 
above factors in each individual case involves a complex interplay between overlaying public 
interests." Id. and is "ordinarily for the jury to determine .... " Barlow, 95 Idaho at 893, 522 
P .2d at 1114. The test, in summary, is not ''wrongfulness" but one of balancing interests to 
determine whether the interference was justified or privileged. The burden is not on Syringa to 
establish the absence of justification or privilege. 
Qwest' s selective recitation of facts (Qwest Brief, pp. 21-24, 28-29) which draws 
inferences in support of Qwest contrary to the requirements of Rule 56 does not establish, as a 
matter of law, that its interference was justified or privileged. Given the strong public policy in 
Idaho Code§ 67-5726(3) against inf1uencing an award of a public contract (and the fact that it is 
illegal for a public officer to do so (Idaho Code § 67-5726(2)), Qwest has not established that its 
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interference was justified or privileged. 7 At a minimum, the question of justification or privilege 
is a question for the jury on the evidence in this case. 
As to Qwest's third point, Qwest fails to establish that the DOA "unilaterally" issued the 
amended SBPOs because the record contains undisputed evidence ofQwest's involvement and 
direct interference with the Teaming Agreement. As noted above in connection with Gwartney 
and Zickau, evidence in the record that creates genuine issues of material fact and from which a 
jury could reasonably infer intentional interference by Qwest is summarized in Plaintiffs 
Statement of Material Facts in Support ofResponse to Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment (R. Conf. 1-31) and supported by the documents and testimony attached to the 
Affidavit of David R. Lombardi In Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. Conf. 73-301 ). That evidence proves that as of January 30, Qwest was 
"on the defensive and wants much more" (R. Conf. 17-23); that Qwest, ENA and DOA officials 
met in closed-door meetings on over thirteen occasions, including a meeting at the Bitter Creek 
lounge in Boise where Qwest received advance notice that ENA would be selected as theE-Rate 
provider, exchanged multiple e-mails and letters including "detailed circuit pricing" emails, and 
engaged in discussions concerning pricing on February 9 and 10, 2009 before the amended 
SBPO's were issued; (R. Conf. 11-17; Berry Deposition, p. 154, L. 4- p. 162, L. 18, R. Conf. 
439-440); and that Qwest pressured ENA, in the presence of Mr. Zickau, to become a 
subcontractor to Qwest (R. Conf. 7-8; 27-30.) 
Qwest's subversion of the open and competitive bidding process likely also meets the "wrongful by some means 
other than the interference itself necessary as a part of Syringa's prima fact case for interference with 
prospective economic advantage. Because a binding contract existed between ENA and Syringa, Syringa's 
focus in this brief is on that tort. Syringa does not, however, waive its claim for interference with prospective 
economic advantage. 
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The evidence of what occurred at the lEN meetings involving Qwest is incomplete 
because the participants have an astonishing lack of recall. The evidence that does exist, 
however, reflects that in the course of these meetings and communications: Qwest met with 
ENA and the DOA to re-work the prices at which it would provide connectivity services because 
Qwest, the DOA and ENA all knew that Qwest's prices exceeded Syringa's (R. Conf. 166, 171, 
173, 174, 185); Qwest wrote language for the amended SBPOs which allocated the connectivity 
work to Qwest (R. Conf. 174-175); Laura Hill used nearly identical language to language 
provided by Qwest in the amended SBPOs (R. 1602, L. 9- 1603, L. 11; R. Conf. 463-64) 
(Supplemental Affidavit ofDavid R. Lombardi,~ 21, Exhibit 18, R. Conf. 302-487 at 484; 
R. Conf. 147-155 at 148 and amended Qwest SBPO, R. 586-589 at 588-589; That Bob Collie, 
who participated in the closed door meetings on behalf of ENA, reported EN A's relationship was 
in jeopardy due to pressure from Qwest and that Mike Gwartney and Greg Zickau were under 
some kind of need to give Qwest this deal or appease them at a minimum. (R. 166.) and Qwest 
employee Clint Berry "knew all along" that Qwest would be providing connectivity. 
There are, in short, genuine issues of material fact that preclude the entry of summary 
judgment dismissing Syringa's interference claims against Qwest. 
E. Attorney Fees. 
1. The District Court Correctly Denied Fees to The State Respondents. 
The district court properly denied the State Respondents' request for attorney fees under 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and§ 12-121 under this Court's holding in Potlatch Education Ass 'n v. 
Potlatch School District #285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010). (See Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Attorneys Fees attached to Syringa's December 21, 2011 Motion to 
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Augment the Record to Include Content Required by I.A.R. 28(b )( 1 ), at page 20). The district 
court also properly denied fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) because Syringa's claims were not 
unreasonable. Id. 
(a) Potlatch and six subsequent cases squarely held that "Idaho Code 
§ 12-117(1) is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the 
entities to which it applies." 
In Potlatch, the plaintiffs sued a school district for breach of contract. The school district 
prevailed on appeal and sought attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) and§ 12-121. Id. at 
634,226 P.3d at 1282. This Court denied fees under§ 12-117(1) because the plaintiffs' appeal 
was not unreasonable. I d. It also denied fees under § 12-121 "because I. C. § 12-117 is the 
exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it applies." Id. (citing 
Westway Canst., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 116,73 P.3d 721,730 (2003)). 
The Potlatch rule concerning the exclusivity of Idaho Code § 12-117 has been affirmed 
no less than six times. See Arambarri v. Armstrong, 2012 WL 739486, at *6 (Idaho March 8, 
2012); City of Osburn v. Randel, 2012 WL 1434339, at *4 (Idaho April26, 2012); Kepler-
Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,268 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2012); Smith v. Washington 
Cnty., 150 Idaho 388,392,247 P.3d 615,619 (2010); Brown v. Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,811, 
229 P .3d 1164, 1173 (201 0); Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 264 P .3d 916, 925 (2011). 
These cases settle the matter. Yet the State Respondents argue that the Court's language 
in Potlatch was dicta and therefore not binding. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 41). Not so. 
Dicta is "[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion that is unnecessary to the 
decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)." 
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIO~ARY, Obiter Dictum (3d ed.); see St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. 
Cntr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm 'rs, 91 Idaho 338, 595, 237 P.3d 1210, 1221 (2010). In 
Potlatch, the Court denied fees under§ 12-121 only because§ 12-117 is exclusive. See 148 
Idaho at 632, 226 P.3d at 1279. The exclusivity of§ 12-117 was absolutely necessary to resolve 
the attorney-fcc issue. Hence, the Court's interpretation of§ 12-117 is not dicta. 
The State Respondents also argue that this Court did not mean what it said in Potlatch. 
(Sec State Respondents' Brief, p. 40-43). According to the State Respondents, Potlatch stands 
only for the proposition that § 12-1 17 displaces § 12-121; it docs not preclude an award of fees 
under§ 12-120(3). Id. at 42. But the Court's rationale was clear: "LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive 
means for awarding attorney's fees for the entities to which it applies." Potlatch, 148 Idaho at 
635,225 P.3d at 1282 (emphasis added). 8 
(b) This Court should not overrule Potlatch. 
Stare decisis has long been a staple of American jurisprudence. "[This Court] shall not 
stray from the principle of stare decisis without an exceptionally compelling reason to do so, 
particularly where doing so would be a move to embrace ambiguity over order." Idaho Falls v. 
Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 579,237 P.3d 1200, 1205 (2010). Stare decisis serves many 
purposes, including "sparing [litigants] the necessity of rclitigating every relevant proposition in 
every case" and preventing "the sheer impossibility of reexamining de novo every relevant 
proposition in every case." Bethke v. Idaho Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 93 Idaho 410, 412-13, 462 P.2d 
In any event, Smith v. rYashington County and Westway Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Transp. 139 Idaho 
I 07, 116, 73 P.3d 721 (2003), each held that § 12-117 precludes fees under § 12-120(3). Thus, even if the 
Court's language in Potlatch were not clear, there is no merit to DO A's argument that § 12-117(1) does not 
preclude fees under§ 12-120(3). 
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502, 505-06 (1969) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The State Respondents' 
cross-appeal squarely implicates both concerns-it attempts tore-litigate an issue that has been 
decided six times in the past two years and invites the Court to reexamine a settled point oflaw. 
Of course, stare decisis is not an unbending rule. "Stare decisis requires this Court to 
follow controlling precedent unless it is manifestly wrong, proven to be unjust or unwise, or 
overruling it is necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice." Sopatyk v. Lemhi 
Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, ---, 264 P.3d 916, 926 (2011).9 Potlatch was not manifestly incorrect, 
however, nor is there an obvious principle of law and justice at stake. 
(i) Potlatch is not manifestly incorrect. 
Just last year this Court refused to overrule Potlatch. See Sopatyk, 151 Idaho 809, 264 
P.3d at 926. Thus, in a sense the State Respondents are doubly barred by stare decisis--on the 
merits by Potlatch itself, and on its argum~nt to overrule Potlatch by Sopatyk. Further, the State 
Respondents are unable to demonstrate that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect. 
First, the State Respondents' argument that the legislature did not intend to make§ 12-
117(1) the exclusive authority for awarding fees in favor of a state agency is suspect at best. 
(State Respondents' Brief, p. 39.) The State Respondents cite the Statement of Purpose for the 
bill that amended § 12-117(1) in 2000.JO But the cited Statement of Purpose actually 
demonstrates the opposite. It provides, 
10 
Idaho law presently allows for the recovery of attorney fees against 
public agencies in cases where the public agency frivolously pursues 
Fittingly, in Sopatyk the Court held that Potlatch should not be overruled in light of principles of stare decisis. 
In 2000, the legislature amended § 12-117(1) to allow an award of fees in favor of state agencies against private 
persons. See 2000 S.L, Ch. 234, § 1 (changing "person" to "prevailing party"). It also added the prefatory 
language, ·'Unless otherwise provided by statute." Id. 
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or defends the administrative action or civil judicial proceeding. 
There is no general provision for an award of attorney fees in favor of 
the public agency where the other party to the action frivolously 
pursues or defends the administrative or civil action. 
(State Respondents' Brief, p. 39 (emphasis added) (citing 2000 S.L. Ch. 241, sec. 1.) 
Thus, the Idaho legislature indicated in 2000, notwithstanding Idaho Code§ 12-121, 
there was no basis other than Idaho Code § 12-117 for an award of fees to public agencies 
against adverse parties that took unreasonable litigation positions. Accordingly, in the "mind" of 
the Idaho legislature, § 12-117 became the exclusive means by which a public agency could 
obtain fees for frivolous litigation. 
The same result is apparent by comparison of the language of§ 12-117, § 12-120, and 
§ 12-121. Read in isolation, § 12-120 and § 12-121 apparently allow fees in favor of a public 
entity. But statutes must be read in conjunction, not isolation. See Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. 
Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 16, 232 P.3d 330, 336 (2010). Also, the Court has developed rules of 
construction to resolve conflicting statutes: "When two statutes conflict, the more specific statute 
controls over the more general." Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 502, 915 P.2d 724, 732 
(1996) (citation omitted). Section 12-117 specifically governs the award of attorney fees in civil 
proceedings between a person and state agencies. Hence, it is the more specific statute that 
controls in the event of a conflict with the general attorney-fee statutes, § § 12-120 and 12-121, 
and the apparent conflict does not establish that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect. 
Third, the State Respondents' proposed interpretation would render either§ 12-121 or the 
relevant section of§ 12-117 duplicative and superfluous. "[T]he Court must give effect to all the 
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. 
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Schulz, 151Idaho 863,---,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011) (citation omitted). If§ 12-121 and§ 12-
117 applied to the same case, § 12-121 would permit an award of fees for frivolous litigation 
positions while§ 12-117 would such an award. 
Fourth, State Respondents argue that the phrase "Unless otherwise provided by statute" 
refers to § 12-120(3) and § 12-121 and engrafts the general attorney-fee regime onto cases 
governed by§ 12-117. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 45.) But the prefatory language does not 
operate in this manner. At its core, § 12-117(1) reads, "Unless otherwise provided by statute ... 
the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees ... if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I. C. § 12-117(1) (emphasis 
added). Thus, in cases to which § 12-117(1) applies, an award of fees for unreasonable litigation 
positions is mandatory-"[ u ]nless otherwise provided by statute." The prefatory language does 
not incorporate the general attorney-fee regime; it simply permits the legislature to establish a 
different attorney-fee regime to subsets of cases in which§ 12-117(1) would otherwise require 
an award of fees. Idaho Code§ 6-918A is an example. 
Fifth and finally, the State Respondents argue that "this Court has continued to award 
fees to state agencies pursuant to § 12-120(3) or § 12-121 even ajier the Pot latch decision." 
(State Respondents' Brief, p. 44.) Specifically, the State Respondents incorrectly contend that 
this Court "award[ed] attorney fees to Hagerman Highway District pursuant to§ 12-121" in 
Zingiber Investment, LLC v. Hagerman Highway District, 150 Idaho 675, 249 P.3d 868 (2011 ). 
ld. at 44. 1n fact, this Court stated: "the district court properly awarded attorney fees to the 
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[Hagerman Highway] District under I. C. § 12-117 .... " Id. at 686, 249 P.3d at 879 (emphasis 
added). 11 
The State Respondents argue that this Court awarded fees under§ 12-120(3) to a state-
run university in Sadid v. Idaho State University, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154 (2011). (State 
Respondents' Brief, p. 44.) That is correct. But universities are not subject to§ 12-117(1). See 
Horne v. Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 706, 69 P.3d 120, 126 (2003). Thus, Sadid does not 
conflict with Potlatch. 
Finally, 12 the State Respondents cite Doe v. Idaho Department of Health & We(fare, 150 
Idaho 491, 497, 248 P.3d 742, 748 (2011). In Doe, this Court granted fees to the Department of 
Health and Welfare under § 12-121. See id. The award conflicts with Potlatch. But the Does 
apparently did not present an argument that Potlatch prohibited a fee award under§ 12-121. 13 
Thus, Doe likely stands only for the proposition that the Court will not decide a case based on 
arguments not presented to it. In any event, the existence of a single anomalous case does not 
prove that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect. No obvious principle of justice requires Potlatch 
to be overruled. 
Idaho courts must adhere to precedent unless it is manifestly incorrect or "overruling it is 




The Court awarded fees to LynCiif, a private party, under I.C. § 12-121. See Zingiber Inv., 150 Idaho at 686, 
249 P.3d at 879. This holding is consistent with Potlatch, because § 12-117(1) does not apply to litigation 
between private parties. 
The State Respondents also cite Stoddard v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679,687, 239 P.3d 784, 792-
93 (20 10). In Stoddard, the Court declined to award fees to the school district. Thus, Stoddard does not 
conflict with Potlatch, although the Court technically should have denied fees under§ 12-117 instead of§ 12-
121. 
The briefs in Doe were sealed. Accordingly, counsel could not defmitely determine whether the § 12-117(1) 
issue was argued in that case. 
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926. As this Court recently stated, "there is no obvious principle of justice at stake here .... 
Since Idaho follows the 'American Rule' for attorney's fees, no fee awards are available absent 
contractual or statutory authority." Sopatyk, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d at 926. The State 
Respondents fail to identifY an obvious principle of law or justice that requires Potlatch to be 
overruled. Hence, Potlatch is binding under principles of stare decisis. 
(c) The District Court properly denied fees under Idaho Code§ 12-
117(1). 
The State Respondents argue that it is entitled to attorney fees under § 12-117(1) because 
Syringa brought this case without standing, failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and had no 
evidence to support its tortious interference claim. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 54.) But 
Syringa has, to the contrary, demonstrated in this brief and its Opening Brief, that it was not 
required to exhaust administrative remedies in order to challenge the amended SBPOs and that 
its tortious interference claims are well supported with admissible evidence. The district court 
specifically found that Syringa's claims were reasonable: "Based upon its review of the entire 
record, the Court cannot find that Syringa acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
(Memorandum and Order re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees, p. 22.) The State Respondents have not 
established that Syringa's claims are unreasonable. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
denial of fees under§ 12-117(1) and deny the State Respondents' attorneys' fees on appeal 
should they prevail. 14 
14 The State Respondents do not present any argument that it is entitled to fees under Idaho Code§ 6-918A. 
Accordingly, any such argument is waived and the Court must affirm the district court's decision on this issue. 
Ball v. City of Blackfoot,--- Idaho---, 273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Idaho March 2012). 
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2. No "Commercial Transaction" Took Place Between Qwest and Syringa. 
The district court did not identifY a commercial transaction between Syringa and Qwest. 
Nonetheless, it granted fees because both Qwest and Syringa participated in the "larger 
commercial transaction" of the lEN bidding process. (Memorandum Decision and Order re: 
Costs and Attorneys' Fees, p. 13.) This holding is erroneous and requires reversal if the 
dismissal of Syringa's Complaint against Qwest is affirmed. 
Until recently, tort claims could not support an award of fees under Idaho Code§ 12-
120(3). See Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, ---, 256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011) (describing this 
history). Now, a prevailing party may obtain fees for claims sounding in tort or contract, so long 
as a ~·commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit," without regard to whether 
the claim sounds in tort or contract. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'lAss 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 
P .3d 1104, 1110 (2005). In short, Idaho law has shifted from a claims-based to a transaction-
based approach. 
While a party can recover on a tort claim based on a commercial transaction, the 
commercial transaction must still have occurred between the prevailing party and the non-
prevailing party. See Soignier, 256 P.3d at 734 (''[The] commercial transaction occurred 
between the prevailing party and the party from whom that party seeks fees." (emphasis added)). 
Several recent cases illustrate this requirement. In Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 
Idaho 242, ---, 254 P.3d 1238, 1246 (2011), the Court denied fees to the defendants (Blue Dog 
and KL Properties) against the plaintiff (Jacklin) because "Blue Dog entered into a commercial 
transaction with KL Properties, and KL Properties entered into a commercial transaction with [a 
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third party], but there is nothing in the record indicating that either Defendant entered into a 
commercial transaction with Jacklin." In Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes 
Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, ---, 264 P.3d 379, 387 (2011) this Court denied fees to the 
defendant (Hopkins) against the plaintiff (LU) because "there was a transaction between LU and 
HPGC, and a separate transaction between HPGC and Hopkins, but there was no commercial 
transaction between LU and Hopkins." InBECO Construction Co. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 
Idaho 719,726, 184 P.3d 844,851 (2008), the Court denied fees to the defendant (J-U-B) against 
the plaintiff (BECO) because "[t]he case at bar clearly involved a 'commercial transaction' 
within the meaning ofl.C. § 12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and BECO and 
not between J-U-B and BECO." See also Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, ---,265 
P.3d 1144, 1154 (2011) ("However, the other Defendants cannot recover attorney fees under[§ 
12-120(3)] unless Plaintiff alleged a claim seeking to recover on a commercial transaction with 
them." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). It is not sufficient that the parties were involved in 
a larger commercial transaction. 
The district court erred because there was no commercial transaction between Qwest and 
Syringa. This Court's statements in Jacklin, Hopkins, and J-U-B apply equally to this case. 
There was a commercial transaction between Syringa and ENA, a commercial transaction 
between ENA and the State, and a commercial transaction between Qwest and the State, but 
there was no commercial transaction between Qwest and Syringa. Accordingly, the district court 
erred by granting fees to Qwest. Notably, the analysis contained in Qwest' s Brief does not 
identify a commercial transaction between it and Syringa and suffers from the same deficiencies. 
- 47-
Qwest also seeks an award of fees under§ 12-121. Qwest's Briefat 38-39. The district 
court did not address this argument. As noted above, the Teaming Agreement is enforceable and 
Syringa produced evidence of interference with that contract by Qwest. Accordingly, Syringa's 
claim was not baseless, and the Court should deny fees under§ 12-121 as well. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The district court decisions granting Defendants· motions for summary judgment 
dismissing Count Two, Count Three, Count Four and Count Five of Syringa's Complaint should 
be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In addition, the district court decision 
awarding attorneys' fees to Qwest should be reversed, the award of attorneys fees to ENA should 
be vacated pending further proceedings, and this Court should award Syringa reasonable costs 
and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this appeal against EN A. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of June, 2011:/~~, 
GIVENS PURSLEY\ LLP 
j n; 
~/// ( 
By• \v . ' 
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